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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing and 
Financial Management at the International Hellenic University. Banks are facing late loan 
payments and loan defaults, although lending terms have changed in recent years. Loan defaults 
involve costs due to the lending activity that banks must be held accountable for. Loan loss 
provisions are recorded in the provisioning account included in the credit line of the banks' 
financial statements in order to minimize the projected loss from the loan portfolio. This paper 
examines the relationship between Loan Loss Forecasts (LLPs) and microeconomic and 
macroeconomic variables. Most importantly, the main pillar of the research remains whether the 
stock market price can affect the forecasts of losses in the following banking institutions. 
Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain (PIGS Banks). In addition, although stress tests, we can assess 
future risks and use information about the capital adequacy and liquidity of the institution. There 
will be an examination of whether they are conservative and constitute a large amount of LLP 
will mark the image of a healthier and more prepared Bank to investors, thereby contributing to 
market value. It was expected that the results would demonstrate that a Bank that is listed in 
Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain would produce a positive correlation between the formation of 
LLPs and the stock market value. 
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“No matter how different the latest financial frenzy or crisis 
always appears, there are usually remarkable similarities with 
past experience from other countries and from history.”  
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 8973. 
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1. Introduction 
The “credit crunch” of 2007 began with the securitized real estate loans in the United States 
and financial institutions were particularly affected (Ackermann, 2008; Haughwout et al., 2011). 
The economic crisis has led many borrowers to face financial problems and not being able to pay 
their pre-specified loan installments (Anke Weber, Emanuel Kopp and José Garrido, 2016). 
Therefore, non-performing loans have been a determinant variable of the financial stability. 
Hence, the supervisory authorities have stepped up their efforts to ensure financial stability 
because if they failed to take preventative measures, it can directly lead to the next unforeseen 
financial instability. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has drawn up a framework for 
the operation of banking institutions in order to succeed the capital adequacy through the 
analysis of Non-Performing Loans. Thus, it decides about the proportion of Loan Loss Provisions, 
which act as a solution to NPLs. The pillars for making assessments on the banking system focus 
on the assessment of the sensitivity and vulnerability of a loan portfolio to significantly and 
hypothetically extreme, but possible, conditions of deterioration of an economy in 
macroeconomic and microeconomic level which is called “stress testing” (Virolainen, 2004; 
Blaschke et al., 2001). 
Banks face late loan payments and loan defaults although lending terms have changed in 
recent years. Loan defaults incur costs due to lending activity for which banks have to be held 
accountable. Provisions for loan losses are accounted for in the provisioning account included in 
the credit side of the banks’ financial statements in order to minimizing the projected losses from 
the bank loan portfolio resulting in a more efficient credit management operation (Laeven, 2003). 
Income smoothing, capital management, signaling and tax management purposes controlled by 
the bank managers in use of ‘discretionary’ loan loss provisions (Laeven, 2003; Leventis et al, 
2011). The 'non-discretionary' provision for loan losses is part of the loan loss forecasts that banks 
cannot manage due to the fundamental credit risk and economic factors that are the main cause 
of the change in the stability of the bank's lending portfolio. Current loan loss provisioning 
behavior by banks is significantly influenced by both bank regulation, emphasizing the 
importance of protecting banks’ stability, and accounting standard setting, which aims at 
improving the transparency of financial statements (Balla and Rose, 2015). Transparency and 
comparability of financial statements based on the incurred loss approach and reducing 
discretion and opportunistic earnings management, but loan losses which providing from banks 
will be limited which reasonably expected to occur in future periods. Moreover, many observers 
have argued that the incurred-loss model to provisioning reduces the amount of unallocated 
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LLPs, preventing banks from adequately from adequately capturing subjective and judgmental 
aspects of credit risk assessment and compromising their ability to face unexpected losses (Curcio 
and Hasan 2015). 
In accordance with the above, the aim of this research will be to investigate the relation 
between Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) and microeconomic and macroeconomic variables. Mainly, 
we aim to investigate if the Stock Market price are able to influence the Loan Loss Provisions. 
Our sample consists of the banking institutions of the following countries; Portugal, Italy, Greece 
and Spain (PIGS Banks). Thus, our research question is the following:  
Will PIGS banking institutions be able to ensure their viability after a severely adverse financial 
recession and their Stock Market price could play a key role on this path? 
The nature of our research will be a quantitative research in which there will be included the 
data collection, the hypothesis, the modelling and analysis of the data, and the evaluation. More 
specifically, we run initially a panel model regression in order to investigate the microeconomic 
and macroeconomic relations. Then, we run a macro (bottom-up) stress testing in order to 
investigate the first part of our research question. Regarding the stress testing, we have to 
mention that we use the Value-at-Risk approach and its Historical Simulation Methodology in 
order to estimate the expected values of the variables we chose. 
Stress tests, a financial instrument for measuring banking and financial risks and bank viability, 
emerged in early 1990. Their use is in the resilience of financial institutions to various risks to 
which they are exposed due to diverse changes in the exogenous and endogenous environment, 
which is related to credit risk. The last financial crisis has highlighted the importance of credit risk 
for banking institutions as well as the need to develop methodologies related to measuring the 
bank’s sensitivity to various extreme but possible scenarios. Two of the main indicators that 
measure the extent of exposure to a bank's credit risk are the amount of Non-performing Loans 
and the level of the Loan Loss Provisions for such loans. 
There will be an examination of whether being conservative and form a great amount LLP will 
signal the image a healthier and more prepared Bank to investors, thus driving up the stock 
market value. On the other hand, if admitting having problems of collecting loan repayments by 
forming LLP is signaling a troublesome image thus mirroring it in investors reflect by driving down 
the stock market price. Before analyzing the chapter of methodology approach and findings, we 
will start our thesis by covering the literature review on LLPs, their usage by Banks as a smoothing 
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tool and how they affect the financial statements of banks. While we will also cover the 
significance of non-performing loans and the urgency of finding adequate solutions.  
The empirical analysis and results on the credit risk of the banking systems of the four 
countries concerned can create an important dilemma where it could pose a challenge for 
governments and policy makers. In particular, the dilemma for policymakers is between the 
following two options: (i) the continued and further increase of their interventionist role by 
limiting lending to protect financial stability or, (ii) maintaining the existing credit risk regulations 
so that there is a degree of freedom of decision making by banking organizations so that there 
can be fields of competition and profitability. The answer to this dilemma is the need to adopt a 
macro-prudential policy. 
It was expected that results will demonstrate that a Bank that it is listed in Portugal, Italy, 
Greece and Spain will produce a positive correlation between forming LLPs and stock market 
value. However, in the empirical results of this thesis there is no complete trend in this direction. 
Specifically, when a bank stock is depreciated then the relationship between the value of the 
stock and Loan Loss Provision is positive. Whereas, when the stock is overvalued then the 
relationship is negative. We believe that although having the need of forming LLPs is a bad signal 
for the liquidity of the Bank, when you operate in a problematic market it might actually give the 
exact opposite signal. Regarding PIGS Banks which have to handle a big amount of non - 
performing loans, having a large percentage of loan loss provisions to total assets gives a more 
secure and stable image to investors. Thus, there are far less cautious that they might incur future 
losses due to occurrence of unexpected events. In addition, the credit risk of the sample banks 
under consideration in our sample may be affected by endogenous and extrinsic factors that are 
examined in this thesis. Moreover, if a decade has passed since the last financial crisis, the 
banking systems of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece and their credit risk are almost strongly 
susceptible to microeconomic and macroeconomic changes. The current trend is common even 
if a banking institution has an underestimated or overvalued share. 
The rest of the dissertation is as follow. We initially present the literature review about the 
loan loss provision, Non-Performing Loans and the empirical and academic results about the 
stress testing. Then, we analyze the empirical strategy, this is, the data, the methodology, and 
the models. Thereinafter, we present and discuss the empirical results and our conclusions 
regarding the research question.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Stress Testing 
Stress test results are the basic principle of sensitivity analysis of a financial institution or 
market as a whole. These results complement the data and data gathered from the evaluation of 
the legal, organizational, regulatory and supervisory background and also the structure of the 
financial institution and its major weaknesses and finally the empirical analysis of some financial 
indicators.  
A stress test is defined as the number of techniques used to calculate the results that will 
result in an entire financial system or a financial institution from applying extreme but plausible 
scenarios. Stress testing is often used to describe either quantitative or qualitative techniques 
applied by banks in order to test whether they are sensitive to potential extreme events (Kupiec 
2002). 
Stress testing is defined as the process of identifying the effects of the extreme and adverse 
market and economic conditions on the Bank's portfolio or the banking system as a whole. 
Historically, stress testing has been and is one of the key tools for managing market risk. A key 
feature of the usefulness of these exercises is their application to check the stability of a financial 
system. With the extreme scenarios taken into account we are able to perceive more is the 
marginal tolerance of the system under consideration. Stress tests are carried out both for 
individual credit institutions and for entire financial systems to examine their reactions to 
adverse changes in their macroeconomic environment. In short, it is safe to say that this tool is 
particularly useful for those who are involved in risk management for banking institutions and 
organizations. 
Through stress testing we can assess future risks and utilize information regarding the 
adequacy of the capital adequacy and the liquidity of the institution. In addition, due to the 
extreme scenarios considered by the institution, this method can also calculate and protect 
against risks that have a very low likelihood of occurrence; however, the institution is up-to-date 
and ready to face even this possibility. 
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2.1.1. US and EU stress tests 
As we mentioned in the introduction, our analysis is based on stress tests and therefore it is 
important to quote some of the results of the US and EU stress tests.  In theory, the stress 
simulation test based determination of the performance of credit institutions on the basis of a 
negative market scenario. Strength tests can be a pillar of bank control as they can give us 
significant advantages. 
Bank stress tests have been historically widely utilized on European and American banking 
systems, which have been carried out on an institution or an industry wide basis. The purpose of 
this part in our research project is to provide a practical outline from the perspective of the 
central banks regarding the period from 2007 to 2018. Thus, we will focus on United States and 
the European Union, based on the European Banking Authority, European Central Bank and the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System official publications.  
The first part of this review will focus on the period 2007 and 2008. For the EU we can argue, 
on the basis of a report published by the European Central Bank (ECB, 2008), that the institutions 
have so far carried out the tests. In other words, banks' performance was called for to be assessed 
under a risk situation. The ECB was responsible for procedural guidance to that point. The report 
states that several structural issues stem from the banks' liquidity test procedure. In order to 
clarify, it should be noted that one of the key issues concerned the content of the test subjects. 
It is noteworthy that only 35 of the 78 banks included in the study used an institutional and 
systemic approach to stress control. The two approaches used by the 35 banks aimed at creating 
appropriate scenarios, only 11 structured scenarios involving combined relevant and specific 
market disturbances. It is noteworthy that institutional simulation approaches employ only seven 
of the participating banks and only eleven scenarios at market level. Another issue to note is the 
mandatory disclosures. The results of the endurance tests do not require public publication by 
the institutions. This is not a positive and effective phenomenon, as only 11 banks in the sample 
choose to disclose to the public the results of endurance tests. 
The banking system of the United States showed many similarities with the situation of banks 
in Europe for that period, as it was the date of the US economic crisis. The main axis of the stress 
test carried out was the fulfillment of the requirements of the Convention of Basel II to a large 
extent. Indicators capital requirements contract evidentiary standard bank management 
practices within their classification (Haldane, 2009). 
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With regard to stress tests across the EU from 2009 to 2014, it is important to emphasize the 
following. Common standardized tests for banking entities have begun to be introduced by the 
authorities of both countries In Europe, changes began in 2009 with the first EU-wide stress tests. 
Three more EU-level stress tests were carried out, 2010, 2011 and 2014 respectively. The main 
principles that coordinate the whole process, depending on the focus period, are the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, the European Banking Supervisory Committee, the 
European Banking Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board (EBA, 2016). The extent of 
stress tests was gradually increased to 70% in 2014, as described by the percentage of total 
European banking assets examined. Inflation and unemployment have been the main basis of 
the scenarios from the change of various macroeconomic indicators such as GDP. Since 2010, 
indices of government debt shocks have been the main basis. It is also noted that the nature of 
the tests mainly targets the required capital of the bank, as the clauses on the inability of 
countries to carry out the proposed reforms were introduced in 2014. This is also evident from 
the proposed corrective actions in place in 2010, of national supervisory authorities (Goldstein, 
2017). In 2014, banks did not reach their set targets due to a specific time limit in order to submit 
new capital plans (Goldstein, 2017).  
In the United States, the results of stress tests were created by the Dodd-Frank operation. The 
key pillars are CCAR (Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review) and DFAST (Dodd Frank Act 
Stress Test). CCAR’s target institutions with over $ 50 billion in cumulative assets, while DFAST’s 
include institutions with over $ 10 billion in cumulative assets. The overall Tier 1 capital adequacy 
ratio, which is the basis for comparing high-quality funds with risk-weighted assets, will decrease 
from 11.1% in the third quarter of 2012 to 7.7% in the hypothetical stress scenario (FED, 2013), 
as mentioned in the DFAST results. For 2014, the same rates are between 11.5% and 9.7% (FED, 
2014). Supervisors and bank holding companies create the CCAR tests. This is also the case in 
Europe. The only major difference with the US authorities is the corrective actions that each take. 
The prohibition of capital distributions until the submission of a permissible capital plan that 
includes replenishment of potential deficiencies is a key idea of the US authorities. 
For the period 2015-2017, the main body of conducting stress tests in the EU in 2016 is the 
European Banking Authority. It is worthen that stress tests do not include a pass or fail clause. In 
addition, the data and methodology of the process are freely read by the general public as they 
are the basis for promoting the integrity of the process in relation to the results. In addition, it is 
important to note that the initial weighted average of CET 1 capital requirement in December 
2015 is 13.2%, a value which confirms the ongoing capitalization of EU banks since 2011. 
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As far as the United States are concerned the CCAR tests are conducted at an annual basis. 
The tier 1 common capital ratio was 12.5%, 12.1% and 12.5% for the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. 
The total number of objected capital plans and required resubmissions of them was 1 for 2015, 
3 for 2016 and 1 for 2017. Actions towards transparency have been taken as well, based on the 
grounds that the whole data set utilized for the process is available to general public, along with 
the methodology used. The number of institutions participating in the process keeps steadily 
increasing, reaching 34 in 2017. The FED reserves the right not to accept a capital plan, based on 
quantitative metrics such as the aforementioned capital ratios but also based on qualitative 
considerations such as the strength of the capital planning process or the corporate governance 
mechanisms of a related institution. It should be highlighted that all relevant objections and 
resubmissions for the examined period were based on qualitative considerations (FED, 2015; 
FED, 2016; FED, 2017).  
For the year 2018, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has disclosed the outcomes of the 
2018 EU-wide stress test, which involved 48 banks from 15 EU and EEA countries, including 
broadly 70% of total EU banking sector assets. The adverse scenario has an impact of -395 bps 
on banks' CET1 fully loaded capital ratio (-410 bps on a transitional basis), leading to a 10.1% 
CET1 capital ratio (equity capital and reserves to total RWA) at the end of 2020 (10.3% on a 
transitional basis). Regarding US, all banks exceeded the minimum required capital under stress 
for the fourth year in a row, which resulted in lower post-stress minimum capital levels. Under 
the severely adverse scenario, the tier-1 risk-based capital ratio was 9.5, the tier-1 leverage ratio 
was 6.1 and both respectively were 1.1 and 1.2 lower than 2017.  
All the above bank stress test information provides a background of the issues which the 
current banking system still tries to tackle, as how banks ought to balance their leverage ratio 
with the required holding capital. Moreover, stress tests are illustrated for the bank’s strategically 
benefit which helps in making better decisions to enhance performance during downturns. 
Furthermore, stress test improves risk management and capital planning through more robust 
and concrete stress testing, as management can further improve the bank’s performance, 
improve consistent valuation and provide better returns for their shareholders in a safe long-
term manner. 
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2.2. Empirical Evidence 
Empirical studies have shown that debt repayment time is more than doubled in times of 
recession, with non-performing loans increasing and banks' Loan Loss Provisions adjusting 
accordingly to be able to cope and remain viable Jennifer Betz et al. (2017). It is worth noting that 
non-performing loans constitute an important obstacle to the growth and sustainability of the 
banking sector and it is necessary to examine and control them in relation to various factors that 
are intrinsically and exogenously interdependent in a banking system. Increasing the non-
performing loan increases the risk of borrowing and the likelihood of deteriorating loan quality 
and volatility of the financial system Dayong Zhang et al. (2016). 
For a short period of time, there have been various purposes of assessing and assessing the 
credit risk of banking institutions in conjunction with applying a stress scenario. These models 
take into account various types of variables. These variables can be grouped into two groups 
which are microeconomic and macroeconomic. The purpose of these scenarios is to help bank 
management determine Loan Loss Provision based on changes in Non-Performing Loans. The 
most important studies and their results are presented below regarding the Loan Loss Provisions 
and Non-Performing Loans. 
2.2.1. Loan Loss Provision (LLP) 
Loan loss provision is the most significant accrual for the banking sector (Lobo, 2017). Usually, 
the median ratio of LLP to earnings range between 15% and 20% and the median ratio of LLP to 
stockholders’ equity is around 10%. Under some estimations, LLP reflects changes in expected 
future loan losses (Non-Performing Loans), a process that allows for discretion in LLP estimation 
(Kanagaretnam, 2003). The estimation of LLP currently incurred by loss model, which is similar to 
accounting for contingencies. Bank managers are often estimating the likely implications of 
events that have already occurred. According to the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS/IAS), loan assessment must be based on the current value of the related expected cash 
flows and LLPs cannot reflect losses based on future expected events.  
Specifically, IAS 39 “Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement” currently 
prescribes that provisions must be calculated based on a so called incurred-loss model, which 
allows provisioning for credit risk only when there is objective evidence that the loss event has 
occurred before the balance sheet date. (IFRS) However, in July 2014, the International 
Accounting Standards Board issued a new version of IFRS 9, which introduces an expected loss 
model for the recognition and measurement of LLP. This model allows managers to incorporate 
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estimates of potential future events, and therefore affords managers considerably more 
discretion than does the incurred loss model (Lobo, 2017). 
Information on its non-discretionary data provides the basis for the Loan loss provision. 
Variables that provide information about probable loan loss is the basis of the level of non-
discretionary provisions. Moreover, if non-discretionary determinants provide value information 
that determines the level of loan loss provisions or forecasts then a positive relationship between 
loan loss provision and non-discretionary determinants is expected. Otherwise, if the non-
discretionary determinants do not transfer value information about the level of reported loan 
loss provision or impairment then a negative relationship between the said provision and the 
non-discretionary determinants is expected. (Beaver, 1996). 
The non-discretionary component is mainly due to bad loans and to the default risk of bank’s 
credit portfolio. It covers expected credit risks and increase with bank lending activity, and its 
growth with indicators (like the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans) capturing expected 
credit risk (Bouvatier, 2008). The bank size is an important dimension of credit risk management. 
The larger banks may be more vulnerable to the “too big to fail” problem that creates too much 
risk to take on, trusting in the intervention of governments in the event of failure (Soedarmono, 
2012; Mishkin, 2006). The relationship between LLPs and size is non-monotonic, as higher as the 
credit portfolio diversification is, the big banks will have a negative sign (Pérez, 2008; Leventis, 
2011). Non-discretionary provisioning shows a strong cyclicality (Laeven, 2003; Bikker, 2005). The 
non-discretionary component determines the cyclicality of LLPs and may lead to a misevaluation 
of expected credit losses. Credit losses may be under provisioned during economic upturns, while 
provisions may be become less timely and charged too late during downturn periods (Laeven, 
2003). 
The discretionary component is used to achieve managerial purposes. In a situation 
characterized by fluctuations of the business cycle, provisioning policy can be used to stabilize 
earnings and dividends (Alessi, 2014). Increases in LLPs used about provision of future earnings 
based on the hypothesis that discretionary component has a positive effect on market value 
(Beaver, 1996). There are three main reasons to explain bank’s discretionary behavior, other than 
providing a realistic evaluation of the risks associated to outstanding loans: income smoothing, 
capital management and signaling (Bikker, 2005). 
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2.2.2. Non-Preforming Loans (NPLs) 
 
Definitions and Relationships 
As it is described above, the non-discretionary use of LLPs is that banks should monitor the 
amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) through the creation of Loan Loss Provisions. In the years 
after 2007 and the spark of financial crisis, banks found their NPLs growing immensely and as a 
result their capital diminishing which led to an inability of lending activity to healthy businesses 
and a general stuck of the economy as a whole. First of all, we start this chapter but making 
crystal clear which loans are characterized as non-performing. An NPL is a loan which is past due 
over 90 days. To be more specific, if a client does not fulfill the loan obligation to the bank for 
more than 90 days then his loan is considered an NPL (Xu, 2005). Generally, a loan cannot 
perform not only for borrower related reasons but also by poor credit risk management of the 
bank. 
It is logical that banks desire the lowest possible amount of NPLs in their balance sheet as this 
is a signal of a low level of risk thus facing a low amount of possible losses. A banking institution 
is established on the terms of confidence and trust of the clients. In any case, a large amount of 
NPLs is signaling a fragile position on the mind of the customers who might choose to withdraw 
their deposits and put them in elsewhere while also preventing perspective customers to pledge 
their businesses future through financing from the bank.  
John Taskinsoy's (2018) study focuses on Malaysian banking institutions doing an empirical 
test by applying a Stress Testing from a macroeconomic perspective. Malaysian banks are 
characterized by high durability and are interconnected. In addition, his study highlighted the 
positive contribution of the Malaysian stock market to the banking industry, as the stock market 
in this country is growing rapidly with a high volume of transactions and bonds. The conclusion 
of the macro-stress testing is that no bank has managed to deal with winding-up or suspension 
of the license. A different perspective is the research of Constantine N. Baltas et al (2017) where 
he focused on the following: “Cost Efficiency - Liquidity Creation Hypothesis” (CELCH) and 
additionally found the positive relationship between a bank's cost level and liquidity creation 
through use of an econometric VAR model. 
Canbaatar & Selenge (2012) considered 12 Mongolian commercial banking systems for the 
period 2002 to 2011. The purpose of this study was to examine the sensitivity of non-performing 
loans and loan loss provisions to adverse macroeconomic situations. They therefore took into 
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account the various macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators. The analysis showed that 
credit risk is influenced by GDP (negative correlation) and the dollar by the local currency 
exchange rate. Finally, the present study argues that the larger a banking institution, the better 
credit risk protection. 
The study by Anna Pestova and Mikhail Mamonov (2012) has shown that macroeconomic 
factors are the main culprits that can cause the deterioration of the quality of a banking system's 
portfolios. In addition, some microeconomic indicators are able to contribute to this 
deterioration, such as ROE, ROA, capital adequacy, growth rate on total lending, and many 
others. A similar study with a study country in Greece was conducted by Louzis, Voulidis & 
Metaxas, 2011. The present study focused on investigating the relationship between non-
performing loans and different types of loans. The underlying assumption for the above 
differentiation was that each type of lending is affected differently by microeconomics and 
microeconomics and resulted in qualitative and quantitative differences in causality and 
relationships. The main conclusion of the present study was that consumer loans are highly 
susceptible to interest rate volatility, the relationship between business loans and GDP growth is 
significantly strong and finally mortgages appear more resilient to macroeconomic fluctuations. 
Debtors’ sustainability, resilience, and solvency is directly affected by the macroeconomic 
environment. Akhter and Daly (2009) and Babihuga (2007) examined this by conducting research 
and linking health and solvency to financial strength indicators (FSIs). Their empirical results have 
shown that the economic cycle, inflation, real exchange rates, short-term interest rates and the 
size of the industry affect the solvency of debtors. In addition, GDP growth, changes in real 
interest rates, unemployment rates and the exchange rate have a significant impact on Glogowski 
(2008) loan losses. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2017) correlated credit growth of countries with high level 
of NPLs on their domestic banks and argued that credit growth of those countries remains slow. 
More specifically, the study reports that firms that are more dependent on bank finance are likely 
to be more affected from the reduced lending capacity of banks. The IMF study also 
demonstrates that banks that faces a high level of NPLs on their balance sheets also have a lower 
lending ability to the real economy. Furthermore, Anastasiou (2018) stated that there are three 
main reasons for this phenomenon: 
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 Lower profitability: The existence of a high NPL level implies less net operating income for 
a bank. Moreover, increased levels of NPLs translates into increased effort from the human 
resources in order to manage and monitor the large stock of NPLs which is time and cost 
consuming. 
 Higher capital requirements: It is clear that NPLs are risky assets, thus higher capital 
requirements will be needed from the Bank in order to compensate from the potential loses.  
 Higher funding cost: Banks that hold large amounts of risky assets are an unattractive 
option for other banks and investors to be funded so they either don’t lend them or lend with 
higher funding costs.  
Measures and Restructuring 
Stijepovic (2014) stated that three types of restructuring measures should co-exist in order to 
have a proper bad debt restructuring process and they are the following: 
 Financial restructuring measures: Firstly, it is essential to create a restructuring plan for 
each loan separately. This restructuring plan should contain collateral valuation, adequate 
legal documentation and financial information about the business activities of the borrower. 
Other financial restructuring measures could be the debt relief, interest rate cuts and a 
payment extension of the interest.  
 Corporate restructuring: A corporate restructuring is often an alteration in the capital 
structure of each firm such as changes firm’s capital, organization, assets and management. 
Changes in management structure could also include the removal of the already existing 
manager while changes in assets means that a company can sell its assets for retrieve cash 
purposes and therefore ensure its payment obligations.  
 Business restructuring measures:  A key business restructuring measures could be the 
option of a merger or acquisition, consideration of exports / imports, a change in the strategy 
of the firm or the realization of “disinvestment transactions”.  
According to Cambell (2007), during the last twenty years, the most common method for 
coping with the problem of non-performing loans is the creation of an institution by public 
authorities, which will be responsible for dealing with NPLs.  These institutions are widely known 
as asset management companies (AMCs). AMCs, in most cases are government administrated 
companies which “buy” the distressed asset from the bank so that the Bank can report a healthy 
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balance sheet. Moreover, Wood (2000) mentioned that the main benefits and drawbacks for 
choosing this method are the following: 
 Enhancement of credit discipline: if there is a clear separation of bad loans from the 
financial institutions this might lead to a more effective and objective management of NPLs.  
 Division of labor: separating NPLs from a distressed bank permits to the bank managers 
to be more concentrated on banking restructuring and new lending, since AMCs managers have 
to be focused on the recovery of NPLs.  
However, the separation of NPLs and Good Assets has some drawbacks, such as:  
 Pricing of bad assets: It is a much-labored process the correct pricing of the transferred 
bad assets, especially during economic crises.  
 Political intervention: The vast majority of AMCs are state owned. So, it is not so easy to 
exclude the governmental management and therefore to avoid a potential political 
interference.  
Another tool could be that state can take over problematic banks for a while; these ones are 
called state owned banks (SOBs). Although this is a risky and difficult operation as it is difficult to 
continue operating as commercial bank but still pursue collecting impaired loans. Since 
prevention is the best solution for the NPLs, (Anastasiou, 2018) stated that there are three 
mechanisms that if they can be implemented simultaneously, it can successfully minimize the 
risk of creating NPLs: Tightening of bank supervision and strengthen of capital requirements, 
Structural reforms and Developing internal NPL management skills. 
Bank supervisors should require from banks to set aside even more capital for non-performing 
loans which remain on their book for a long period while also require the loan restructuring plan 
to lie within a logical time period.  Regarding the structural reforms it should me mentioned that 
court procedures are very time consuming and hence they should be definitely shortened. 
Garrido, (2012) proposed that the out-of-court arrangement should be highly encouraged. Such 
reforms would make it easier for banks to write off bad loans. Concluding, banks have to organize 
a specialized inclusive management plan for NPLs in which they will specify the rules and 
practices for the resolution of NPLs. Ends, below we present the NPLs measures that were 
implemented in the Euro-Zone since the beginning of the 2007-2008 financial crisis (IMF, 2017): 
[20] 
 
 Bad banks: Banks that are in an alarming situation due to high NPL levels usually setting 
up bad banks. The role of bad banks is to take over the impaired assets/loans and relieve 
private bank’s balance sheet.  
 System-wide Bad banks: Banks with problematic loans, which are under restructuring 
transfer their non- performing assets to these bad banks. Prominent examples of system-wide 
bad banks are BAMC of Slovenia, SAREB in Spain and NAMA in Ireland. Such banks can create 
economies of scale in the illiquid assets management. It has to be mentioned that a publicly 
owned bad bank’s capital structure plays an important impact on public finances, because bad 
banks’ NPLs are considered as public debt.  
 System-wide aid free mechanisms: There are also mechanisms that doesn’t involve state 
aid. Specifically, on February 2016 an asset protection scheme was approved by the 
Commission for the Italian banks and as a result, the Commission came to the conclusion that 
the transfer of NPLs has to be done at market prices without the state aid inclusion.  
 Asset protection schemes: An alternative measure to the physical transfer of NPLs was 
the provision of guarantees in order to cover the losses that have to do with a specific asset 
portfolio. Schemes like these have the ability, through an insurance mechanism, to cover the 
losses until we have favorable market conditions again. Spain, Germany and Austria are 
primed examples of this measure. 
Resolution Methods 
Regarding the NPL resolution, if a bank wishes to achieve a desirable solution, a number of 
factors should coexist (Anastasiou, 2018). Firstly, there should be a legal and regulatory 
infrastructure that enact laws and rules in order to facilitate the resolution of NPLs. Alongside 
the legal and regulatory infrastructure, prudential regulatory authorities have to give stronger 
incentives to banks to accelerate the collection of NPLs. Apart from the above, bank shareholders 
have to finance the planning objectives of the bank.  In the study of Xu (2005) is presented the 
most popular NPL resolution methods and they are the following.  
Debt-for-Equity-Swaps are a good way of handling problematic loans (Stijepovic, 2014). Most 
commonly, these swaps are created to help that company that faces struggles while also aid them 
to continue their operations. A lender should claim a rise in the margin and the restructuring fee 
payment, the provision of future guarantees while also enjoy further deleveraging. Moreover, 
the borrower is seeking a standstill agreement in the negotiation stage of the debt for equity 
swap terms.  The debt for equity swap is a highly beneficial resolution method as it enables 
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companies not only to relieve them off their loan obligations but also to continue competing and 
operating. Furthermore, a debt for equity swap can achieve a better value for all stakeholder 
who otherwise could claim only partial value for specific creditors if insolvency measures would 
apply. On the other hand, debt for equity also have some disadvantages. Firstly D/E swap most 
of times is time consuming, thus expensive. Moreover, a D/E swap might not fulfill both creditor 
and company’s aims. 
Another resolution method with good results is the direct sales to investors.  The most 
common kind of direct sales is debt rights with settled assets coming second while equity rights 
is not that usual. Investors seeks earning in the existing difference between their ultimate 
recovery price and the purchase price. According to Xu (2005), some investors “manage to 
foreclose on assets backing the loans”, despite the existing difficulty coming from legal and 
bureaucratic limitations. In some countries, there is an inadequacy of repossession and 
foreclosure laws. This means that foreign investors are bidding on deals which are acceptable to 
the borrower and they try to achieve settling NPLs at a reasonable price. Furthermore, weak 
bankruptcy legislations translate into foreign investors seldom taking part in restructuring 
programs of companies in debt. 
With the term securitization in relation to non-performing loans, we mean a securitization on 
the receivables that relates to the awaited stream of cash flows that result from the NPLs. The 
major advantage with this kind of asset securitization process is that cash flows of a diversified 
loan portfolio are transforming into marketable securities that can aim at a broad investor base 
where the desired risk characteristic varies. In other words, securitization allows the design of 
securities with different security levels (i.e. various returns and maturity dates) where each 
tranche has varied classes of loss protection and consequently could appeal to different kind of 
investors who can be risk averse or risk seeking. If we have to mention a potential drawback for 
the securitization process it might be the deficiency of the respective legislation. Securitization 
appears to be an terrific solution because it permits the collection of a significant number of 
assets and as a result, there is an instant cash recovery for the seller (Anastasiou, 2018). 
The above studies will be used to design, study and test a model for assessing credit risk 
sensitivity in a sample of economies that have been strongly affected by the recent financial 
crisis. Such models can actively contribute to better assessing banking institutions and improving 
their profitability and productivity. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Data Sample and Data Sources 
The first criterion for selecting the sample was to investigate the credit risk of economies that 
have been heavily affected by the last financial crisis of 2007. The second criterion was to select 
banks that are under the supervision and regulation of a common association or union. 
Therefore, we have chosen to go ahead with the selection of countries from the European Union, 
which are also included in the euro area. So, our analysis based on time-series data from the four 
European countries, which are Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain-, also known as the PIGS 
countries. In terms of data collection, most of the data was derived from the Databank of World 
Bank. Specifically, we used some of the World Development Indicators and the database of 
Bankscope. It is assumed that data from the Databank of World Bank, including the estimates, 
are accurate. Additionally, we decide to collect annual data during the period of 2012-2018. The 
initial sample of PIGS banks from the international database “Bankscope” comprised an 
unbalanced panel of 1266 banks which contained listed, unlisted and delisted banks.  
After removing unlisted and delisted banks and any banks that had less than two years of 
reported loan loss provisions data, the sample size was reduced to 60 PIGS banks covering the 
period between 2012 and 2018. Particularly, the sample consist of 4 Greek banks, 43 Italian 
banks, 2 Portuguese banks and 11 Spanish banks. All bank data is in thousands of euros to allow 
for ease of comparison. It is assumed that the data has been accurately entered into Bankscope.  
It is important to note that we use Bankscope and the World Bank as a database in order to have 
consolidated data because Bankscope relies on World Bank data for calculating many indices.  
As to the econometric technique to get the model only variables whose coefficients are 
statistically significant, that is variables that have a statistically significant effect on its 
configuration in our dependent variable, we evaluate the model sequentially by omitting each 
time the variable whose coefficient represents the largest p-value. Following this procedure, we 
arrive at the equations. Table 1 presents summary of descriptive statistics for the variables used 
in the empirical analysis. The dependent variables are loan loss provisions (LLP). Indicatively we 
can mention that PIGS bank’s assets consist on average of € 26,475,028.89 and the PIGS banks 
LLP € 4,001,233.83. The outstanding loans consist the 49.36% of total asset, the ratio is high 
because of the low liquidity during the economic crisis period. 
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It is also worth mentioning the macroeconomic characteristics of these four economies. The 
macroeconomic analysis will be based on three key macroeconomic variables which are GDP 
growth rate, unemployment and inflation. According to Table 1, the average GDP growth of the 
four economies under consideration is 0.93%. However, the minimum price is around -7.95% and 
we find it in the Greek economy in 2012. In addition, we see that inflation is 0.80 points, while in 
the Greek economy there was a negative sign of inflation in 2013. Finally, regarding 
unemployment where there is a significant problem of the four economies under consideration, 
on average it is around 14.12% with the highest price to be presented in the Greek economy in 
2013. 
3.2. Specifications 
 
3.2.1. Econometric Specifications 
There are three ways to analyze the data, (i) time-series, (ii) cross-section, and (iii) panel data. 
Panel data have important advantages over the cross-section and time-series data (Cheng Hsiao, 
2007). Initially, time series data looks at the values of one or more variables by a given period of 
time. In the stratospheric data, values from one or more variables are collected for several 
samples of variables for the same time period. In contrast, in the panels data, the same stratum 
unit is examined over time. So we can say that data analysis using data panels has space and time 
dimensions. Panel data has a large cross-sectional dimension, and thus, it eliminates the 
correlation between explanatory variables, and the estimations are more reliable and consistent. 
The basic panel model is as follows: 
 
Υit = β0 + β1Χit,1 + β2Xit,2+. . . … … + βkXit,k + ai + uit 
Equation 1. Basic Panel Model 
 
Where: 
Yit = observation of the i-dependent variable Y for i = 1, 2,..., n and t = 1,2, ..., t. 
Xi,j =  t is the observation of the unit i of the independent variable Xj  for i = 1,2,..., n; t = 1, 2, .., 
t; and j = 1,2,...k. 
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αi = the unobserved factors affecting the dependent variable. 
uit = the error that expresses unobserved factors that affect the dependent variable over time. 
Additionally, there are two methods in the processing of data panels, fixed and random 
effects. Fixed and Random Effects Model are as follows: 
Υit = β0 + β1Χit,1 + β2Xit,2+. . . … … + βkXit,k + ai + uit  , Cov(ai, Xit) ≠ 0 
Equation 2. Fixed Effects Model 
Υit = β0 + β1Χit,1 + β2Xit,2+. . . … … + βkXit,k + ai + uit  , Cov(ai, Xit) = 0 
Equation 3. Random Effects Model 
It is important to mention some of the advantages and disadvantages of the panel data that 
we consider when evaluating and analyzing the results, and are as follows: 
 Pros of Panel Data 
1. The possibility of investigating the heterogeneity of individual units and identifying their 
particular characteristics. Simple chronological series or stratigraphic data ignore this difference 
between stratigraphic units and can lead to biased estimates (Moulton, 1986; 1987). 
2. The ability to indirectly consider in the econometric estimation of the model all those 
variables which cannot be directly included in the empirical model. 
3. The problems of heterosexuality, multi-linearity and specialization errors are best dealt 
with. 
4. The ability to analyze the process and dynamics of data adaptation over time while 
maintaining individual heterogeneity in the characteristics of the stratum units. 
5. Allow the empirical specialization of more complex theoretical models to analyze the 
behavior of stratigraphic units which is impossible using only time series or stratigraphic data. 
 Cons of Panel Data 
1. Difficulties in designing research and collecting statistical data. 
2. Existence of measurement errors. 
[25] 
 
3. Existence of selectivity bias. 
We use the above two forms of panel data in the following empirical study and perform all 
necessary diagnostic tests to check the reliability of our models. In general, we will perform the 
following diagnostic test: Hausman test, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier, Breusch-Pagan LM 
test of independence, Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence, Modified Wald test for 
GroupWise heteroskedasticity, and Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. 
3.2.2. Empirical Specifications 
The baseline model of our thesis is based on the model adopted by Bouvatier (2008) and 
Leventis (2011). Loan loss provisions used as dependent variable while the explanatory variables 
are the non-discretionary and discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions. Thus, I run the 
following regression model: 
𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑛(
𝐵
𝑀
)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Equation 4. Baseline Model 
The above baseline model covers a general spectrum and therefore needs further 
investigation in order to be able to analyze in depth the estimated results in a general as well as 
in an individually level, i.e. country level. Therefore, we will run a specialized regression and it is 
as follows:  
𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑛(
𝐵
𝑀
)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛿2𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Equation 5. Specialized model 
In the above two models, the i indicates a banks and t denotes the year. The dependent 
variable (LLPi,t) is equal to the ratio of loan loss provisions on total assets and subscripts refer to 
bank i in year t. We also use several indicators to identify the non-discretionary component of 
provisioning, capturing loan loss provisions made to cover expected credit losses and exhibiting 
a cyclical pattern. In particular, we consider the loan to total assets ratio (Loansi,t-1), and the 
ratio of non-performing loans on bank’s net loans (NPLi,t-1), as measures of expected loan 
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default risk of the overall bank’s credit portfolio and bank’s financial stability. We also include 
the logarithm of total assets (Assetsi,t-1) as a proxy for bank size. Furthermore, in order to test 
whether banks also use LLPs to manage their regulatory capital (i.e., to make provisions to keep 
their capital ratio adequate when their capital is low) we use the ratio of equity to total assets 
(Equityi,t-1). 
According to the income-smoothing hypothesis, banks may use loss provisions to smooth their 
income by overstating (understating) LLPs when incomes are expected to be high (low). In line 
with most of the empirical literature, we thus use the ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss 
provisions to total assets (Earningsi,t-1) to test for the positive relationship between LLPs and 
income implied by the income-smoothing hypothesis. A negative relationship with LLPs is 
expected if capital management is present, even if the scope for such behavior has been 
significantly reduced since Basel accords (Bouvatier, 2008). Also includes the lagged value of loan 
loss provisions (LLPi,t-1) to take into account the existence of a dynamic adjustment, as 
provisioning decisions may be systematically related to each period leading to time persistency, 
and capture the speed of adjustment of LLPs to an equilibrium level. We also include the natural 
logarithm of book to the market value ratio Ln(B/M)i, t-1 to correlate the value of stock prices of 
the banks with the loan loss provisions at the same period. 
Moreover, we are going to use three country control variables. Firstly, the growth rate of GDP 
at the regional level, which measured as purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included 
in the value of the products. Secondly, we use the inflation rate as measured by the annual 
growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator and it shows the rate of price change in the economy as 
a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant 
local currency and the unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work 
but available for and seeking employment allows to control for the effect of macroeconomic 
conditions and thus for the cyclical pattern of loan loss provisions (Pérez, 2008). Thirdly, the last 
macroeconomic control variable which we use is the unemployment rate. We decide to include 
this variable in our model since it has been used by many scientific researches and it has been 
characterized as a key point of the customers’ solvency.  
With regard to econometric analysis, in order to be able to answer our research question, we 
will perform econometric analysis of three data sets. The first group takes into account the entire 
database. The second takes into account the banking systems in which their banking stock is 
undervalued and the third takes into account the overvalued banking institutions. The 
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categorization was made on the assumption that when the Book to Market variable is greater 
than or equal to one unit, they are considered underestimated while less than one unit are 
overestimated. 
3.3. Stress Testing: A Value-at-Risk Approach 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a tool which can be used in order to measure the maximum possible 
change in the price of a portfolio such as loan portfolio of financial instruments at a given 
confidence level. This is, according to Best and Philip W. 1998, Value-at-Risk defines the 
maximum loss of money over a certain period, given a level of confidence.  
There are several ways to calculate value at risk and that will be used in this thesis is the 
Historical Simulation Approach because it is flexible and comprehensive (Mahoney, 1996). We 
decide to use this methodology because we will use realistic data, the changes occur in each 
period under consideration and we will use a big amount of observations (Dowd, 1998; Barone-
Adesi and Giannopoulos, 2001). Opinions about the reliability of the results of this method 
exclude the research community. For example, Hendricks (1996) supported that the reliability is 
a function of the confidence level and the time span.  
The Historical simulation approach for calculating the VaR has the following two simple steps. 
Firstly, we use yearly observations from 2012 to 2018 and we assess the variables under 
consideration separately due to their cumulative distribution of prices. Secondly, we rank the 
observations in ascending order because we seek out the q-quintile, which is the confidence 
level. More specifically, q-quintile is the price that the q % of the observations are on the left side 
and (1-q) % on the right side. 
We have decided to do macro stress testing because we are able to evaluate a banking system 
as a whole or individually for each banking institution. The stress test will be based on the 
equation 5 and its econometric results. Therefore, stress testing will have a quantitative effect 
after the simultaneous change of various microeconomic and macroeconomic factors because a 
key assumption of such controls is that future financial crises will have characteristics of the past 
(Breuer & Krenn, 1999). However, empirical results have shown a significant difficulty of these 
controls which is to quantify the likelihood of extreme scenarios (Kosmidou & Moutsiannas 
2016). 
According to the literature, the kind of stress we follow is of the form from base to top. In 
particular, we will apply three types of stress scenarios which are (i) Baseline, (ii) Adverse and (iii) 
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Severely Adverse scenario and the confidence levels used to calculate the values are 5%, 1% and 
0.1% respectively. Therefore, the stress testing of this thesis will not take into account the 
expectations of international financial institutions, business plans and bank strategies. Thus, we 
aim at reasonably hypothetical scenarios with a higher incidence rate with the aim of generalizing 
the information provided. 
It is also worth noting that we will calculate the values of the above three scenarios for each 
dependent variable and not for each country separately because the model 5 model uses the 
dummy variables created for this reason. In addition, our data is from 2012 to 2018, so we will 
calculate the value at risk for 2019. Finally, for the best approach to increase or decrease credit 
risk we will calculate the change rates for the estimated price for 2019 with LLPs average for 
2018. 
3.4. Hypotheses  
In the literature, provisions for bank credit risk are commonly distinguished in two 
components: a discretionary component and a non-discretionary component. As it was 
mentioned in the previous chapter of this Thesis, the non-discretionary component of LLPs is 
related to the problematic loans and to the default risk of bank’s credit portfolio. LLPs are 
expecting to increase along with the bank lending activity as the higher the volume of bank 
lending activity is the higher is the probability of having a problematic loan thus measures of LLPs 
are coming into the question. 
Soedarmono (2012) shows that bank size is an important element of bank credit risk 
management. Specifically, larger banks may be more prone to the “too big to fail” theory that 
creates moral hazard incentives to take on too much risk, trusting in the intervention of 
governments in the event of failure (Mishkin, 2006). This can lead to a far less cautious 
provisioning policy, leading to a negative relationship between LLPs and bank size. On the other 
hand, discretionary part of LLPs is being used to achieve managerial purposes with a view to 
stabilize earnings and dividends (Alessi, 2014). Banks may increase loan loss provisions when 
their earning are high and decrease them when they are not just to be presented as stable 
institution with constant profits over time thus reducing the perception of default probability 
(Titman, 1998), stabilizing the compensations of higher management (Tirole, 1995) and granting 
a steady flow of dividends to bank stockholders (Alessi, 2014).  
In this Thesis, we initially decided to examine the expected results on some assumptions 
relating to banks that are operating in countries that faced big crisis in their economies (PIGS 
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countries). Thus, we made a couple of assumptions that we will present below which will lead to 
the major assumptions of this Master Thesis and thus we present below the null hypotheses of 
our thesis. 
H1: During crisis periods, in this case Banks of PIGS countries, the incentives to use LLPs 
for income management decrease and the relationship between loss provisions and 
earnings may become negative.  
H2: According to “too big to fail” theory, there is a positive correlation between LLPs and 
Bank Size. 
H3: Macroeconomic indicators (GDP, inflation rate, unemployment) are expecting to have 
a positive correlation with loan loss provision in PIGS Banks. 
H4: There is a positive correlation between LLPs of PIGS Banks and their stock value.  
The above fourth hypothesis is the core point of investigation in this Master Thesis. We expect 
that PIGS Banks are enjoying a positive correlation between forming LLPs. The notion behind this 
assumption is that a problematic bank, or to be more accurate, a Bank that is operating in a 
problematic financial environment, will signal a much more stable position by having a greater 
percentage of LLPs, thus enhancing investors trust which is leading to a rise in the stock prices. 
On the other hand, if a Bank that is operating in a thriving economic environment is increasing 
their LLPs then the signal it is giving to investors is that this is a risky Bank to invest thus pushing 
the trust and ultimately the stock prices down. 
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4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
4.1. Econometric Results 
In this chapter of our thesis, we present, analyze and discuss the empirical results. We 
mentioned in the chapter about the Data and Methodology that we have two econometric 
models and three data set regarding the credit risk of the PIGS’ banks and the empirical results 
can be found in the tables two (2), three (3) and four (4). Initially, we followed in detail the 
econometric methodology about the panel data and thus we run two types of panel models, 
which are fixed-effect, and a random-effect model. Then, we should assess those two types of 
model regarding the necessary diagnostic tests and thus we took into account every aspect. 
Firstly, we checked the F-test in the fixed-effect model and the Wald-χ2 in a random-effect 
model and thus coefficients are different from zero. Secondly, we used the Hausman test in order 
to choose which one is better and more applicable and its results indicates that we should use 
the fixed effect panel model in both econometric models and in every data set as we mentioned 
above. Moreover, we detected heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in our models with and 
without the dummies variables according to Modified Wald test for GroupWise 
heteroskedasticity and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation, respectively.  So, our initial 
estimations can be considered as reliable and consistent and it is necessary these two problem 
to be solved. 
Hence, in order to have a reliable, statistically significant, and consistent model and estimators 
(coefficients), we estimated a panel regression model with Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors 
estimators for fixed and random effects models and the results are presented in the tables two 
(2), three (3) and four (4) and column three (3), four (4) regarding the equation 4, and columns 
seven (7) and eight (8) considering the equation 5. It is crucial to be mentioned that regarding 
the econometric methodology of Driscoll and Kraay (1998), they assessed and proposed a 
method in which we can perform a non-parametric covariance matrix estimator that concludes 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. As we did before, we have to 
run the Hausman Test in order to choose the model with the most reliable estimators and thus, 
according to Hausman Test, the fixed effect model was more applicable. Furthermore, having 
selected the fixed effect model, the individual effect is part of the intercept, and thus the 
correlation between the intercept and the regressors does not violate the assumption of Gauss 
Markov and in this way, the fixed effect model is Best Linear Unbiased Estimate (H. M. Park, 
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2011). Therefore, our final estimations which we are going to analyze below from the table two 
(2), three (3) and four (4) can be found in the columns four (4) and eight (8) accordingly.  
4.1.1. Microeconomic-Banking Variables 
In the present section of our work, we will deal with empirical analysis and discussion of 
econometric results, and more specifically with the microeconomic or banking variables used in 
our model. In general, the results overlap with existing literature. 
A large number of studies investigating various types of financial risk assume that financial risk 
at time t is related to time t-1 and we have taken this into account as in the studies by Bouvatier 
(2008) and Leventis, (2011). Therefore, as can be seen from the results of Tables 2, 3 and 4, the 
Loan Loss Forecasts at time t-1 can positively influence the course of credit risk at time t. 
Specifically, if at the time t-1 the loan loss provision increased by one unit, this would increase 
the loss provision by 1.25 units. In addition, the ratio of Loan Loss Provisions at time t-1 to time t 
appears stronger when we consider the banking institutions whose shares are overvalued. 
However, banking institutions whose stock prices are undervalued show a statistically significant 
and negative relationship and the following is inconsistent. The above contrast between 
overvalued and undervalued banks can be explained by the reduced banking profitability of 
undervalued banks and the lack of sound and sound management. 
The first and foremost discrepancy we see in the results of our econometric analysis is the 
relationship between non-performing loans and loan forecasts. The relationship between these 
two variables should be positive, because when non-performing loans grow in a banking system, 
banks' management must take immediate action to ensure its viability and the key tool is to 
increase forecasts for loan losses. However, in our sample the results are contradictory. In 
particular, their relationship is negative and statistically significant in all three cases. For example, 
taking into account Table two (2) and Column four (4), the increase in non-performing loans by 
one unit will result in a decrease of Loan Loss Provision by € 2.64. Therefore, according to the 
above result, there is a clear deviation in the banking systems of the four economies we are 
analyzing on average. It is also worth noting that in banking institutions that have undervalued 
stocks, the relationship under consideration is weaker but statistically significant. 
We have mentioned in the analysis of the methodology and the hypotheses under 
consideration that we want to examine through our model the "too-big-to-fail" ideology and thus 
we used the variable Assets in order to check the relation between those two variables. According 
to Tables two (2), three (3) and four (4), and column four (4), we find that the relationship 
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between the two variables is positive. That is, an increase in the assets of a banking system will 
lead to an increase in Loan Loss Provisions. Therefore, when a banking system has a large volume 
of Assets, it will allocate more funds to ensure its viability. For example, if the asset increases by 
one unit, it will increase the provision for loan loss by € 2.29 (Table two (2) and Column four (4)). 
As a result, banks operating in the four tested economies, that were strongly affected by the last 
global financial crisis of 2007, have a strong activity aimed at ensuring their sustainability. 
Concerning data categorization by the share price and thus if it is under- or overvalued, it is worth 
noting that when a bank has an overvalued market share, the relationship between the assets 
and Loan Loss Provision is more intense than when the share price is undervalued. 
The analysis of the discrete elements enables the control of income and capital smoothing 
management cases has a positive effect on market value. According to recent empirical literature 
(Beaver, 1996) the coefficient of variable earnings is positive and statistically significant at taking 
into account Table 2 and Column 4, the increase in earnings by one unit will result in a loss 
forecast of € 1.53, a result that is compatible with the use of smooth earnings forecasts over 
time. Earnings before taxes and loan forecasts decrease as banks increase their forecasts for loan 
losses (and vice versa) by enhancing the cyclicality of LLPs. These data confirm that in times of 
economic recession, higher risk levels and lower profit levels, banks do not have the necessary 
incentives to use LLPs for profit management purposes and tend to adopt a more prudent 
approach to forecasting. 
When they have a high loan to asset ratio in their loan portfolio, bank managers maintain 
higher loan loss provisions. A loan to total assets is an indicator that shows the level of leverage 
of an economic organization. According to the results of our sample, we observe that the 
relationship between this ratio and the forecast for loan loss is positive and so does the 
categorization of the data based on the share price. Indicating that the decrease (increase) in 
bank forecasts over the previous period follows the decrease (increase) in bank forecasts in the 
following period. The empirical results of Cavallo and Majnoni (2002), Bikker and Hu (2002) and 
Ozili (2018) support the view that when bank management underestimates credit risk in times 
when lending increases, they will tend to reduce capital for Loan Loss Provisions. This may be due 
to the financial instability that prevails in the lending environment, bank managers need to be 
prepared for unexpected losses, gradually increasing loan loss forecasts in each period, which 
may not be detected by traditional one’s banks' credit risk management tools.  However, this is 
not shown in our results and we could consider that these four banking systems were strongly 
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affected during the crisis period and there was a significant increase in non-performing loans and 
thus appear cautious. 
One of the basic guidelines of this thesis is to study the relationship between Loan Loss 
Provisions and Book to Market. The results are inconsistent between the categorizations and are 
worth noting and analyzing. Initially, taking into account the whole sample (Table 2, Column 4) 
the relationship is statistically significant and negative, and we also appreciate the categorization 
with the banking institutions where they appear to have a stock price that you consider 
overvalued. However, when banking institutions appear to be undervalued, the relationship is 
positive and statistically significant. 
The analysis of microeconomic variables will conclude by presenting the empirical results 
between the relationship of Loan Loss Provision and Equity. The results here appear to be 
balanced. That is, the relationship between the two variables considered is positive. Therefore, 
an increase in Bank Equity will lead to an increase in the Loan Loss Provisions of our sample banks. 
However, the relationship appears stronger when banks have overvalued bank shares. 
Overall, these issues confirm that in addition to credit risk factors and these factors (which 
include differences in regulatory guidance), the determinants of bank forecasts are also 
influenced by many factors for bank forecasts, management forecasts, differences loan loss 
provisions, etc.) emphasize the specificity of the banking system and should be taken into 
account when the bank reconcile their provisions. Moving forward, the result underlines the 
importance of studying country-specific factors that directly or indirectly affect the level of 
forecasts for bank loan loss in any regional analysis. 
4.1.2 Macroeconomic Variables 
In this analysis, we have also taken into account three main macroeconomic variables, which 
are GDP growth, inflation and unemployment, which are the main indicators of analysis of an 
economy. Thus, the above three variables show statistically significant results and are analyzed 
below. 
Firstly, the annual growth of Gross Domestic Product has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with the Loan Loss Provision as other researchers have demonstrated (Betz et al., 
2017; Kosmidou and Moutsianas, 2015; Akhter and Daly, 2009; Jakubík and Schmieder, 2008). 
The interpretation of the above can be held by the economic theory. This is, the positive 
relationship between the growth of the Gross Domestic Product and the Loan Loss Provision 
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validates that when macroeconomic conditions prosper, the loan loss provisions will increase 
accordingly because a bank will be able to operate in flourishing economic environment and thus 
it tries to be stronger and safer. Furthermore, when an economy is flourishing, the ability of 
households and firms to repay their long and short-term liabilities is improving and the Bank’s 
operation is stable.  
Consistent with previous empirical literature (Leventis et al., 2011), we provide data on the 
strong pro-cyclic loss pattern prediction problem. Thus, banks tend not to maintain high forecasts 
prior to periods financial crisis but only during this. As noted by Soedarmono et al. (2016) this 
may be the result of facing a risk management model such as LLPs. Having as its result the 
activation of procyclic consequences so as not to allow banks to make adequate forecasts during 
financial short-circuits. 
Secondly, regarding the literature review and the related studies, the relationship between 
the inflation rate with the credit risk is ambiguous because it may be positive or negative (Pestova 
and Mamonov, 2012; Dovern, Meier, and Vilsmeier, 2010; Akhter and Daly, 2009; Jakubík and 
Schmieder, 2008; Babihuga, 2007). Consequently, in proportion to the results, the effect of 
inflation rate to the LLPs is positive. This positive relationship indicates that a decrease of inflation 
rate provokes a less competitive economy Louzis, with losses.  
Moreover, the relationship regarding the unemployment rate is consistent with relevant 
studies (Pestova and Mamonov, 2012; Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas, 2011; Dovern, Meier, and 
Vilsmeier, 2010). The relation between unemployment and LLPs is statistically significant and can 
influence positively the LLPs because it plays a major role in the repayment of debts by the 
borrowers. When the unemployment decreases, then the household income increases, and so 
borrowers can pay their debts. The rise in unemployment is triggering the Bank’s management 
to take immediate action for their viability, and for this reason, for example, forecasts for 
potential losses are rising, and thus, the capital adequacy is increasing.  
4.1.3 Dummy Variables 
We also included Dummy variables in our model so that we could examine and analyze 
individual country-specific changes and the coefficients are statistically significant. Therefore, 
taking into account tables two (2), three (3) and four (4) and column eight (8), it is worth 
mentioning the following. First, as we can see in table two and column 8, the Greek and Italian 
banks have a negative sign. This means that when we consider the Greek and Italian banks, Loan 
Loss Provision is reduced by € 15.3 and € 7.40 respectively. On the contrary, Portuguese banks 
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have a positive sign and this is interpreted as follows. Our sample Portuguese banks appear to be 
more attractive than the other 3 banking systems (Loan Loss Provisions increase by € 28.36). 
Finally, taking into account the Spanish banks through the fixed term of our model we can claim 
that they are more risk-averse because Loan Loss Provision will be reduced by € 933.27 and is 
significantly higher than presented in the Greek and Italian banking system.  
In terms of categorizing banks into overvalued and undervalued according to the variable Book 
to Value the results are more limited. Specifically, in Table three (3) and column eight (8), as we 
can see, the Dummy Greece variable is not considered for correlation reasons while in Table 4 
and column 8 the Dummy Portugal variable is not included for the same reason as the Dummy 
variable above. Italy is not statistically significant.  
First, regarding the Greek banking institutions, when we consider only the times when the 
banks' share is overvalued, they appear to be less skeptical and the same can be found in the 
Spanish banking system. Second, as for the banking institutions of the Italian economy at times 
when their stock is undervalued, we can see a sharp increase in risk-aversion because the rate 
has risen by 2.08 points (ie from -2.002 in Table 2, column 8 to -4.08 in the pin 3 column 8). Third, 
with respect to the Greek banking system at times when banking shares are considered 
overvalued, we observe a large increase in the ratio from -2.72 points in Table 2 to -4.08 points 
in Table 4 and hence the Greek banking systems when displaying overvalued banking shares are 
significantly less skeptical. 
Therefore, in accordance with the above presented facts we can argue that you change the 
banking behavior of Loan Loss Provisions according to their banking shares. That is, when their 
bank stock is overvalued on average they are less skeptical than when they are undervalued. 
4.2. Stress Testing 
When interpreting the results of stress tests, one should always take into account the 
assumptions and limitations put in place from the outset. Some stress tests see banks as static 
portfolios rather than dynamic (internal and external) changes in the environment. It should 
always be borne in mind that when assessing the sensitivity of a financial institution, each bank 
adapts strongly to the various adverse economic conditions. 
The new framework for operating banks, as regulated by the Basel authorities, refers to a 
number of procedures including those related to establishing regular checks on banks by 
imposing some extreme but possible conditions, in order to examine the consequences and 
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precautionary measures are taken to minimize damage in an impending crisis. An accepted 
definition of the stress tests literature is that "stress tests are tools that set two main objectives 
for banks, measuring the adequacy of their funds to determine whether they are sufficient to 
absorb potential large losses and identify ways and steps to reduce this risk and keep funds high 
(Kosmidou Kyriaki, 2008). 
Overall stress tests can be used as a tool by central banks to measure risk-taking results and 
identify potential vulnerabilities in the financial markets. The test results describe the magnitude 
of the impact on key elements related to the stability, viability and profitability of financial 
institutions. It should be noted that the results of the shock test are useful to combine with the 
results of other risk management techniques for two main reasons: (i) to check their validity and 
(ii) to increase their usefulness. 
The interpretation of the stress test results should be based on the assumptions and 
constraints developed in the scenario construction and shock calibration. It should also be borne 
in mind that a financial institution during a time of crisis is not a static entity but adapts its 
strategy to cope with the risk reduction. 
In the design of the stress test to be applied, the type of hypothetical scenarios will be adopted 
according to which the independent variables proved to be statistically significant for the 
dependent variable of the model models that will be used. Applying the hypothetical unfavorable 
prices to the model, we can observe the behavior of the dependent variable and see the effect 
on the banks' capital adequacy. 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the empirical results of stress testing, it is worth 
presenting the hypothetical values (Table 5) which we estimated using the Historical Simulation 
method and used for the calculation of Loan Loss Provisions. Therefore, in Table 5 we present 
the macroeconomic and banking-microeconomic variables, as well as their rates of changes. We 
calculated the rate of change based on the mean values of our sample. In the case of stress testing 
simulations, we will only rely on the statistically significant variables from the Table 2 and Column 
8. Thus, through this part of empirical analysis, we will attempt to answer the first part of the 
research question of this thesis. 
Therefore, using the estimated values at risk, we will calculate the impact of the disturbances 
on the macroeconomic and microeconomic environment in order to predict the rate of change 
of Loan Loss Provision for 2019. It is worth noting that in all three scenarios, we have applied a 
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simultaneous of the statistically significant variables and thus we can consider it to be the 
maximum possible increase in Loan Loss Provision and an increase in credit risk on a more general 
basis by 5%, 1% and 0.1% confidence level. 
As for Table 5, it is worth commenting on the following. First, we see a decrease in banks' 
assets and equity and an increase in non-performing loans. However, in light of the econometric 
results, we have decided to assume that as non-performing loans increase, banking institutions 
will reduce the available funds to be used for Loan Loss Provisions, which is why we are also 
seeing an increase in the Loan to Total ratio. Assets (see Loan in the Table 5). Second, from the 
Baseline Scenario to the Severely Adverse, we have thus calculated the Book to Marker index to 
follow an upward path and be greater than one unit and therefore consider the bank stock to be 
underestimated. Third, in terms of the macroeconomic variables we used, as we saw in the 
analysis of the econometric results, they are all statistically significant and directly affect the 
course of the banking industry. Therefore, GDP growth is declining and negative, inflation is also, 
however, rising unemployment and this could have a direct effect on consumers' solvency to 
repay their loans, as a direct result of the increase in non-performing loans and the management 
of debt. banks should decide to increase Loan Loss Provisions. 
Table 6 presents the results of this thesis Stress Testing. As is evident from the financial results, 
a burden on the banking sector by endogenous and extrinsic factors could lead to significant bank 
solvency problems due to increased credit risk. Moreover, taking into account the Baseline 
scenario, we observe that the smallest variable is found in the Portuguese banking institutions, 
followed by Greece, followed by Italy and finally Spain. Spanish banks are increasingly aware of 
the micro and macroeconomic changes, which can be detrimental to them. However, the largest 
funds for Loan Loss Provision are found in the Italian banks because they have a wide range of 
activities and a large amount of lending and assets. 
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5. Policy implications 
According to the above research and empirical analysis and results, the fundamental dilemma 
that is created with regard to political implications is "to comply with existing regulations or to 
impose new restrictions and regulations?" In particular, the dilemma for policy makers is 
between the following two options; (i) the continued and further increase of their interventionist 
role by limiting lending to protect financial stability or, (ii) maintaining existing ones credit risk 
regulations so that there is a degree of freedom of decision making by banking organizations so 
that there can be found available “fields” of competition and profitability. The answer to this 
dilemma is the need to adopt a macro-prudential policy that, according to our literature, will 
reduce the likelihood of a future financial crisis. Therefore, aiming at the almost holistic answer 
to the above dilemma, we will consider the following three pillars: (i) the implications for 
supervision and regulatory policy, (ii) the need for coordination and (iii) the international 
dimension. 
A. Supervisory and regulatory policy 
According to the study by Bikker and Spierdijk (2008), if the orientation of regulators and 
supervisors tends to increase the intensity of the macroeconomic perspective, it may adversely 
affect the importance attached to their underlying objective of assessing and mitigating 
financials. risks. One key area that could be affected is the decrease in the interest rate on deposit 
protection and the increase in the protection intensity of the system (Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, 
Zhu, 2014). Thus, macroeconomic regulators will engage in exchange and compromise processes 
and thus sacrifice some less important objectives to fulfill a larger and more important one where 
ensuring financial and systemic stability (Betz et al., 2016). 
The operation of banks in its financial market makes them prone to crisis because of the risks 
arising from the scope. Adequate powers are needed to enable banks to be adequately 
monitored as they are difficult and very costly to monitor strongly. An important issue in 
supervision is whether the information that banks receive from supervisors in order to take 
appropriate action on banks' behavior. The discretionary powers of the supervisory authorities 
should entitle them to intervene in specific cases with a view to reversing the impending problem 
by taking appropriate action (Barth, et al., 2013). 
Supervisory and regulatory policy includes the evaluation of a banking system as systemically 
relevant at the country level, at the union level (e.g. the European Union) and at the global level. 
Therefore, the focus has now shifted to the broader assessment to assess the systemic 
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importance of each banking institution to avoid financial instability at the local, union level and 
then to create the next global economic crisis. Thus, one logical consequence of the above would 
be to initially identify organically important and systemic organizations where it could lead to the 
creation of a range of regulatory tolerance that mitigates market discipline and undermines the 
legitimacy of the institutional framework (Barth et al., 2004). 
Finally, it is worth noting that the resilience and sustainability of a financial system is not solely 
dependent on the supervision and the micro and macro-prudential regulations but also on the 
effectiveness of various other factors such as the implementation of fiscal policy by governments, 
the general legislative framework and international standards for financial reporting and 
etcetera. 
B. Coordination 
Since the last economic crisis, there has been a great deal of effort in coordinating financial 
systems and economies because, due to internationalization and international cooperation, 
economies have become interdependent. Therefore, an independent authority should be 
established where the reason for its existence would be the management of macro-prudential 
tools at global and local level. 
The main aim of this authority will be to ensure financial stability and thus its criticality is very 
important for two main reasons, as the study by Atkins et al. (2016). First, the international 
economic community has been unable to accurately measure and quantify the objectives and 
specific objectives of each macroeconomic policy and its regulatory and supervisory bodies. 
Secondly, it is a fact that the authorities are heavily dependent on subjective criteria and thus 
take various measures to meet them. Therefore, measuring or quantifying decisions and 
regulations presents key challenges or weaknesses for macro-prudential policy governance and 
accountability. 
However, it is necessary to stress that there are currently no widely accepted financial risk 
measures to calibrate and evaluate the effectiveness of a policy being used. Therefore, it is easily 
understood that the process of safeguarding financial stability and sustainability is a difficult task 
where you consist of a large number of institutions and organizations that unfortunately have 
different perspectives, objectives and methodologies and this results in different financial tools 
being used. . The main disadvantage we see in the need for coordination between agencies and 
supervisors is that not all of them are designed to ensure the financial stability of a financial 
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system and so the choices of some of them can have a significant and negative impact on this 
process (Betz et al., 2016). 
C. The international dimension 
The modern financial system is designed in such a way as to make it vulnerable to a country's 
microeconomic, macroeconomic, fiscal and monetary policies, and as we have discussed above, 
the need for endogenous cooperation is important, but the need for international cooperation is 
equally important. (Brei et al., 2018; Anke Weber, Emanuel Kopp, and José Garrido, 2016). 
Interest in macro-prudential policy and international coordination has made considerable 
progress. An example to illustrate this is the adoption and acceptance of Basel's regulatory 
framework (Acharya, Engle and Pierret, 2013; Bouvatier, 2008). 
International co-operation is very important because it can form the basis of a sustainable and 
resilient economy at the endogenous and exogenous level and be able to cope with an economic 
pollution and its consequences at country, union and global level (Betz et al. al., 2016). If official 
supervisory power is weak and banks have a wide range of activities then if generous deposit 
insurance is implemented, the requirements work in a beneficial way to distort the incentives. 
For the audit, the effectiveness of the bank as well as the positive effects of the regulation of the 
capital regulation are a confirmation of the positive correlation between them. On the other 
hand, there is a negative impact of the rigor of capital and non-performing loans on financial 
stability. On the contrary, a study by Chortareas et al. (2010), regulatory capital policies have 
proven to have a significant positive impact on bank efficiency. In addition, in the study of Barth 
et al. (2013) has also accepted the Positive Impact of Stricter Capital Restrictions. 
Moreover, it is a fact that a country's banking system holds a high degree of importance in the 
general economy of that country because it plays an important role in macroeconomic 
development. In particular, the deterioration of financial stability can lead to a disruption to the 
real economy with difficult effects such as rising unemployment and a general decline in social 
welfare. Finally, it is a fact that an economic crisis can be triggered by the fall of a stock market 
and have a domino effect on connected and interdependent economies. For this reason, the 
relationship between a bank’s stock market presences may affect its financial stability, and more 
specifically for the study of its current thesis, credit risk. 
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6. Conclusion 
Using an unbalanced panel of 1266 banks which contained listed, unlisted and delisted banks, 
this paper examines loan loss provisioning behavior from the four European countries, which are 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain-, also known as the PIGS countries, during the period 2012-
2018, investigating the main discretionary and nondiscretionary determinants of provisions 
between Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) and microeconomic and macroeconomic variables.  Also, we 
run a stress testing in order to investigate if the PIGS banking institutions be able to ensure their 
viability after a severely adverse financial recession. 
According to the majority of empirical literature, we use a model for empirical analysis for the 
bank lending behavior. Overall, our results clearly show that there is an increased risk of 
defaulting mainly on banks with larger amounts of net loans and loss forecasts. For the total 
credit portfolio, credit risk is inextricably linked to the behavioral factors of banks during the 
crisis. On the contrary, there is no evidence that we can prove that there is both income 
normalization and capital management. 
This result may argue that accounting discipline to limit the discretion of banks. The 
effectiveness of bank capital regulation may be the result of accounting discipline to limit the 
discretion of banks. On the other hand, these elements may be indicative, increasing provisions 
for impaired loans in order to tighten borrowing conditions may be a result of the increased pro-
cyclicality of forecasting behavior during the financial year crisis period. In this respect, the 
transition from IAS 39 approximated the loss in the expected loss model in accordance with IFRS 
9 and its introduction. Therefore, future research should attempt to assess whether enhancing 
the pro-cyclicality of financial stability raises concerns about its effectiveness in relation to capital 
interactions and the application of the new IFRS accounting rules 9. 
Before proceeding to present our conclusions and answer the hermeneutical question and 
hypotheses, it is useful to make a reference to the limitations encountered in this study and are 
as follows. The data and methodology presented have several limitations that should be are 
flagged as likely to affect overall results. First, the sample size can be is considered a restriction. 
however, considering that we examine those four European Union countries most affected by 
the economic downturn and given the fair representation in the sample we have selected banks 
that are listed to have a common examination base.  Secondly, the period covered is only 8 years. 
The results achieved it can change if this period is further extended in the past if we look at our 
sample from the beginning of the economic crisis to the present. But this eight year was chosen 
because it is at the heart of the economic crisis, with the aim of ensuring accuracy and 
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significance of the results. Third, it can be limiting how empirical analysis does not imply any 
quality such as the interviews of managers of PIGS banks and depends entirely on quantitative 
data. Finally, the limitations introduced by us may not be as accurate as the data used, as with 
all empirical tests. For example, the country's political scene may have influenced GDP and 
inflation to avoid financial distress or avoid political losses. Unfortunately, however, this 
limitation cannot be overcome by us, and it is taken as it is in our analysis. 
Regarding the empirical results and the analysis of them, it is feasible to answer our research 
questions and to accept or decline the hypotheses under consideration. First of all, we can 
conclude that the relationship between the non-performing loans and loan loss provisions should 
be positive but this consumption is not approved in the banking systems of the four economies 
we analyzed. It is also worth noting that in banking institutions that have undervalued stocks. 
The under consideration the "too-big-to-fail" ideology that we examine in our model approves 
the positive relationship between the LLP and both Assets and Equity of the banks and from the 
perspective of the bank shares when a bank has an overvalued bank share, the relationship 
between the assets and Loan Loss Provision is more pronounced than when the share price is 
undervalued. 
The analysis suggested that to prevent financial instability bank managers need to be prepared 
for unexpected losses, but the under-examination sample tend to the conclusion that the crisis 
period affect remarkably the systemic banks and there was a significant increase in non-
performing loan. Earnings before taxes and loan forecasts decrease as banks increase their 
forecasts for loan losses, coefficient of earnings is positive, so is compatible with the use of 
smooth earnings forecasts over time. 
According to our analysis, the macroeconomic factors like (GDP, inflation and unemployment) 
have positive relationship with the Loan Loss Provisions. Banks will be able to operate in 
flourishing economic environment and need to be stronger and safer. The rising of the inflation 
rate and unemployment is triggering the Bank’s management to take immediate action for their 
viability, for example, forecasts for potential losses because of the possibility of not repaying 
loans which lead us to a less competitive economy with losses. 
Regarding the above results and conclusions, we can accept the first hypothesis our master 
thesis. That is, during crisis periods, in this case Banks of PIGS countries, the incentives to use 
LLPs for income management decrease and the relationship between loss provisions and 
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earnings may become negative. Secondly, the second hypothesis was about the “too big to fail” 
theory, there is a positive correlation between LLPs and Bank Size and considering our results we 
can accept it as well. Thirdly, it is understood that the macroeconomic activity can influence a 
banking system directly and indirectly. Thus, we use three macroeconomic indicators in our 
model, which are GDP, inflation rate, unemployment. Therefore, having in our minds the third 
hypothesis which support that it is expecting a positive correlation between loan loss provision 
in PIGS Banks and the macroeconomic variables which we used, we can partially accept it. In 
particular, the inflation has a negative relation with the Loan Loss Provision. Finally, regarding 
the core hypothesis of this thesis which is the following “There is a positive correlation between 
LLPs of PIGS Banks and their stock value”, we can partially accept it as well. More specifically, if 
we take the whole sample into account, we cannot accept the above assumption because there 
is a negative relationship and we do so at times when banks have overvalued bank shares. 
However, at times when the bank stock is undervalued we see that we can accept the above 
hypothesis. Therefore, the result is not a clear trend but a dependent trend depending on the 
share price. 
In addition, regarding the implementation of stress testing the results are of great interest. 
Therefore, if a financial bottleneck occurs in the above four economies, they will affect their 
credit risk and their productivity and functionality due to the restrictions on available capital. 
That is, because of financial difficulties, banks will be forced to allocate a larger amount of funds 
to Loan Loss Provisions, and this will lead to a restriction of the funds available for other activities 
and functions of the bank or a banking system as a whole. In particular, according to the results, 
the Italian and Spanish banks will be more heavily affected than the Portuguese and Greek banks. 
Therefore, according to the research question of this thesis we can answer the following. The 
four out-of-state banking institutions will be affected by the emergence of economic hardship at 
the micro and macro levels. In addition, as we have seen, bank share price can play an important 
role in determining Loan Loss Provision but not as important as Assets, Equity, Earrings, 
Unemployment and Inflation. Therefore, according to your political dilemma, that is to say, "to 
comply with existing regulations or to impose new restrictions and regulations?", We could 
support a neutral position. However, the macroeconomic environment, the interdependencies 
between economies through brokerage and other activities, and the lack of a global coordinating 
body may affect the activity of banking institutions or systems operating in economically weak 
countries affected by the 2007 financial crisis. 
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To sum up, according to the literature review and our empirical analysis, many additional 
studies could be carried out. Some of our ideas are presented below. First, financial freedom is 
an important factor that can affect the banking system. In particular, the rules and standards of 
conduct that a banking system must adhere to directly affect its activity and decisions. Therefore, 
an interesting suggestion would be to study the relationship between financial freedom and 
credit risk and in addition to solvency risk because they are two basic types of risk that determine 
financial stability. As far as financial freedom is concerned, we can look through the indicators 
from The Heritage Foundation. Secondly, following our empirical analysis, the following 
proposition could be proposed. The relationship between economic freedom, banking 
competition and financial stability is an important pillar of study. In particular, it would be 
interesting to study how financial freedom can affect the course of a bank stock and then 
whether financial freedom can affect the value of the bank stock and, in the meantime, examine 
how the two above relationships can affect the financial stability.
[45] 
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8. Appendix 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Asset  €  26,475,028.89   €                 6.49   €  259,871.89   €  608,376,000.00  
Non-Performing Loans 49.36% 20.21% 0.28% 91.02% 
Total Loan to Total Assets 49.36% 20.21% 0.28% 91.02% 
Earrings 0.0752 0.2762 -0.0614 2.6603 
Book to Market 2.0165 6.5479 -0.9350 69.3990 
Equity 10.1542 12.5709 -4.8690 92.8780 
Loan Loss Provisions  €    4,001,233.83   €  6,688,994.73   €         374.00   €    36,682,217.00  
Inflation 0.80 0.60 -2.35 2.27 
Unemployment 14.12% 4.98% 6.86% 27.47% 
GDP (%growth) 0.96% 2.05% -7.95% 4.27% 
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Table 2. Panel Regression Results - Equation 4 (column 1 to 4) and Equation 5 (Column 5 to 8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model RE model FE model 
RE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay 
robust standard 
errors 
FE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay 
robust standard 
errors 
RE model FE model 
RE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay 
robust standard 
errors 
FE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay 
robust standard 
errors 
Loan Loss Provisions 0.2326** 0.2298** 0.2326*** 0.2298*** 0.3178** 0.3342** 0.3178** 0.3342** 
  (0.012) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.009) 
Non-Performing Loans -0.0283*** -0.0278*** -0.0283*** -0.0278 -0.0213*** -0.0212** -0.0213** -0.0212** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.031) (0.026) 
Asset 0.8337*** 0.8292*** 0.8337*** 0.8292*** 0.787*** 0.758*** 0.787*** 0.758** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) 
Loans 0.0419*** 0.0424*** 0.0419*** 0.0424** 0.0381*** 0.0387*** 0.0381** 0.0387** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.015) 
Earnings 3.6723 3.448 3.6723 3.448 -1.5291 -2.5283 -1.5291 -2.5283 
  (0.118) (0.175) (0.368) (0.428) (0.549) (0.349) (0.608) (0.426) 
Book to Market -0.0086** -0.0073** -0.0086*** -0.0073** -0.0109*** -0.0082*** -0.0109*** -0.0082*** 
  (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Equity -0.0465*** -0.048*** -0.0465** -0.048** -0.0430*** -0.0484*** -0.0430*** -0.0484** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.016) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.022) 
Inflation 0.2732 0.0997 0.2732*** 0.0997 0.3854* 0.2685 0.3854** 0.2685*** 
  (0.239) (0.783) (0.000) (0.296) (0.083) (0.443) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment 0.1463** 0.1324** 0.1463*** 0.1324*** 0.2394*** 0.2683*** 0.2394*** 0.2683*** 
  (0.001) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gross Domestic Product (% growth) 6.3918 14.9136 6.3918 14.9136** 12.4505** 26.877 12.450*** 26.8775*** 
  (0.327) (0.135) (0.152) (0.027) (0.048) (0.156) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dummy Greece     -2.4809** -2.7291** -2.4809** -2.7291*** 
      (0.018) (0.014) (0.005) (0.000) 
Dummy Italy     -1.8709** -2.002** -1.8709** -2.002** 
      (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.003) 
Dummy Portugal     3.3348** 3.3458** 3.3348** 3.3458** 
      (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -7.1344*** -7.2927*** -7.1344** -7.2927** -68362*** -6.8387*** -68362** -6.8387** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.01) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.014) 
R-squared 0.7667 0.7764 0.7712 0.7671 0.7938 0.7945 0.7938 0.7945 
Hausman Test  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Wald test Prob (F statistic) (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  
F-test   (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Intraclass Correlation (rho) 0.4193 0.7192 0.4193  0.3876 0.5634 0.3876  
Breusch-Pegan Test (0.000) ***    (0.000) ***    
Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence  (1.049) (1.091)   (1.211) (1.017)   
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity  (0.000) ***    (0.000) ***   
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation (0.000) *** (0.000) ***   (0.000) *** (0.000) ***   
Number of observations 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
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Table 3. Panel Regression Results – Undervalued Bank Stocks (Book to Market >= 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model RE model FE model 
RE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay robust 
standard errors 
FE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay robust 
standard errors 
RE model FE model 
RE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay robust 
standard errors 
FE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay robust 
standard errors 
Loan Loss Provisions 0.1002 -0.0371* 0.1002 -0.0371* 0.0005 -0.0079** 0.0005 -0.0079** 
  (0.129) (0.089) (0.130) (0.070) (0.998) (0.002) (0.998) (0.034) 
Non-Performing Loans -0.0183 -0.0082 -0.0183 -0.0082 -0.0059 -0.0042 -0.0059 -0.0042 
  (0.174) (0.534) (0.305) (0.662) (0.636) (0.726) (0.753) (0.726) 
Asset 1.099*** 1.3238*** 1.099*** 1.3238*** 1.2964*** 1.286*** 1.2964*** 1.286*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Loans 0.0386*** 0.0467*** 0.0386 0.0467*** 0.0336*** 0.0337*** 0.0336*** 0.0337** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.208) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.271) (0.056) 
Earnings -1.080 3.796 -1.080 3.796 2.6791 3.0966 2.6791 3.0966 
  (0.901) (0.229) (0.886) (0.551) (0.722) (0.676) (0.690) (0.390) 
Book to Market 0.0256*** 0.0258*** 0.0256*** 0.0258*** 0.0217** 0.0229* 0.0217** 0.0229** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.049) (0.089) (0.032) (0.032) 
Equity 0.0532* 0.0519* 0.0532** 0.0519** 0.0167 0.0142* 0.0167 0.0142* 
  (0.068) (0.060) (0.047) (0.020) (0.452) (0.089) (0.319) (0.076) 
Inflation 0.4356* -0.1669*** 0.4356*** -1.669*** 0.4712 -0.6373** 0.4712 -0.6373** 
  (0.092) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.434) (0.034) (0.254) (0.031) 
Unemployment 0.1495*** 0.1977*** 0.1495* 0.1797*** 0.3301 -0.2810* 0.3301 -0.2810* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.000) (0.265) (0.092) (0.381) (0.069) 
Gross Domestic Product (% growth) -9.007 0.1702*** -9.007 1.702*** -10.8718 Omitted -10.8718 Omitted 
  (0.674) (0.000) (0.348) (0.000) (0.561)  (0.497)  
Dummy Greece     -10.4321** Omitted -10.4321 Omitted 
      (0.082)  (0.207)  
Dummy Italy     -8.0577*** -4.0828** -8.0577** -4.0828** 
      (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.003) 
Dummy Portugal     -2.8353** 1.3239 -2.8353** 1.3239** 
      (0.003) (0.432) (0.001) (0.045) 
Constant -11.266*** -30.62*** -11.266*** -30.62*** -7.6861** -3.5987 -7.6861* -3.5987** 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.024) (0.000) (0.063) (0.377) (0.089) (0.045) 
R-squared 0.5955 0.6709 0.6016 0.6709 0.7248 0.7270 0.7248 0.7270 
Hausman Test  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Wald test Prob (F statistic) (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  
F-test   (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Intraclass Correlation (rho) 0.3169 0.7192 0.4193  0.3876 0.5634 0.3876  
Breusch-Pegan Test (0.000) ***    (0.000) ***    
Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence  (1.155) (1.091)   (1.861) (1.503)   
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity  (0.000) ***    (0.000) ***   
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation (0.000) *** (0.000) ***   (0.000) *** (0.000) ***   
Number of observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
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Table 4. Panel Regression Results – Overvalued  Bank Stocks (Book to Market < 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model RE model FE model 
RE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay robust 
standard errors 
FE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay robust 
standard errors 
RE model FE model 
RE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay robust 
standard errors 
FE model with 
Driscoll-Kraay robust 
standard errors 
Loan Loss Provisions 0.4314*** 0.4623** 0.4314*** 0.4623** 0.3904*** 0.4343*** 0.3904*** 0.4343*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Non-Performing Loans -0.0201*** -0.0208*** -0.0201*** -0.0208*** -0.0200*** -0.0216*** -0.0200** -0.0216** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.004) 
Asset 0.5378*** 0.5022*** 0.5378*** 0.5022*** 0.5752*** 0.5244*** 0.5752*** 0.5244*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loans 0.0331*** 0.0322*** 0.0331*** 0.0322*** 0.0334*** 0.0327*** 0.0334*** 0.0327*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Earnings -3.3216 -3.7924 -3.3216 -3.7924 -1.5503 -2.2246 -1.5503 -2.2246 
  (0.143) (0.127) (0.253) (0.268) (0.531) (0.406) (0.604) (0.506) 
Book to Market -0.0183** -0.0149** -0.0183** -0.0149** -0.018*** -0.01448** -0.018** -0.01448* 
  (0.095) (0.087) (0.024) (0.066) (0.000) (0.03) (0.025) (0.069) 
Equity 0.0901*** 0.1031*** 0.0901** 0.1031*** 0.0884*** 0.1033*** 0.0884** 0.1033*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.1461* 0.305*** 0.1461 0.305*** 0.1656 0.3914* 0.1656 0.3914* 
  (0.087) (0.000) (0.261) (0.000) (0.329) (0.092) (0.225) (0.081) 
Unemployment 0.1479*** 0.1371*** 0.1479*** 0.1371*** 0.1710*** 0.1878*** 0.1710** 0.1878*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Gross Domestic Product (% growth) 10.7757* -6.5037 10.7757*** -6.5037 9.5832* -8.3735 9.5832** -8.3735 
  (0.034) (0.340) (0.000) (0.638) (0.063) (0.531) (0.001) (0.521) 
Dummy Greece     -0.2619*** -0.6202*** -0.2619** -0.6202*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Dummy Italy     0.3558 0.242 0.3558 0.242 
      (0.726) (0.682) (0.561) (0.340) 
Dummy Portugal     Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
          
Constant -4.7965*** -4.4142*** -4.7965*** -4.4142*** -5.5751*** -5.298*** -5.5751** -5.298** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.8937 0.8952 0.7712 0.7471 0.8972 0.8994 0.8966 0.8944 
Hausman Test  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Wald test Prob (F statistic) (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  
F-test   (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Intraclass Correlation (rho) 0.4053 0.8297 0.4053  0.498 0.423 0.458  
Breusch-Pegan Test (0.000) ***    (0.000) ***    
Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence  (1.129) (1.058)   (1.397) (1.108)   
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity  (0.000) ***    (0.000) ***   
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation (0.000) *** (0.000) ***   (0.000) *** (0.000) ***   
Number of observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 
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Table 5. Stress Testing: Historical Simulation VaR 
Scenario Mean Baseline RoC Adverse RoC Severely Adverse RoC 
Asset 26475028.89 23259124 -13.0% 22279081 -17.3% 21184927 -22.3% 
Non-Performing Loans 49.36% 69.00% 33.5% 74.00% 40.5% 85.10% 54.5% 
Loan 49.36% 71.00% 36.4% 76.00% 43.2% 86.70% 56.3% 
Book to Market 2.0165 1.9 -6.0% 1.8 -11.4% 1.75 -14.2% 
Equity 10.15% 9.1% -10.91% 8.7% -15.41% 8.48% -17.74% 
Loan Loss Provision € 40,012.00 € 38,853 -2.9% € 34,024 -16.2% € 33,871 -16.7% 
Inflation 0.8 0.88 9.5% 0.69 -14.8% 0.6 -28.8% 
Unemployment 14.12% 22.10% 44.8% 24.80% 56.3% 26.50% 63.0% 
GDP (% growth) 0.96% -1.49% -0.5% -1.49% -0.5% -5.68% -6.6% 
Notes: RoC is the Rate of Change 
 
Table 6. Stress Testing Results 
 Portugal Italy Greece Spain 
 Loan Loss Provision | 2018   €          533,119.00   €  104,151,011.00   €  36,122,356.00   €    7,300,000.00  
Baseline  €          561,020.01   €  120,190,040.10   €  38,973,771.56   €    8,450,115.04  
Adverse  €          623,340.19   €  140,227,999.00   €  40,723,991.90   €    9,508,391.00  
Severely Adverse  €          690,560.45   €  143,901,871.00   €  44,935,910.00   €  10,320,410.30  
Rate of Change | Credit Risk Portugal Italy Greece Spain 
Baseline 5.10% 14.32% 7.60% 14.63% 
Adverse 15.63% 29.74% 11.99% 26.43% 
Severely Adverse 25.88% 32.33% 21.83% 34.62% 
Notes: In the above calculations we have taken into account the econometric results of Table 2 and Column 8. 
